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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY RITER and 
EDITH SIDERS RIDER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ARISTOS CA YIAS and 
DOROTHY CAYIAS, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 
10697 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEf' 
STATEMENT 
OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action whereby the plaintiff, Harry 
Riter, sought damages against the defendant, Aristos 
Cayias, for an assault and battery and plaintiff, Edith 
Siders Riter, sought to establish certain boundary lines 
between her property and that of the defendants, and 
also to determine the existence and legal standing of 
1 
an easement and right of way across the property of the 
appellant. The defendants and respondents brought a 
counterclaim against the plaintiffs to establish that the 
right of way which they had acquired many years ago ' 
still existed for them and was not lost, and for damages 
for appellants' interfering with and stopping respon-
dent's use of its right of way; and further to establish 
the boundary line between the parties as determined 
by a survey. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff, Harry Riter, abandoned his cause 
of action before the pre-trial. The case of Riter vs. 
Cayias was tried by the Court, without a jury, and the 
Court entered a decree which described the prop-
erty line between the parties and found that both 
of the parties had easements along the boundary line 
between their properties for the purpose of cultivating 
and other matters in connection with their farming, 
and further determined that the pipeline easement and 
right of way which had been purchased by the respond-
ents had not been extinguished nor lost. The appellant 
Edith Siders Riter appeals from that determination 
by the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents ask that the decree of the trial 
court be sustained, and in accordance with the decree 
entered by it. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Edith Siders Riter, and the respon-
dents, Aristos Cayias and Dorothy Cayias, are the own-
ers of two adjoining pieces of property located in Davis 
County, State of Utah. The appellant has resided there 
since 1939 and the respondents have resided there since 
IG41, but they having purchased the property in 1936. 
The survey line between the properties was shown 
Ly surveys and testimony of the parties. The respon-
dents erected a fence a few inches north of the survey 
line, and between the properties of the appellant and 
respondent, following a dispute as to where the line 
existed. (See Tr. 126) There is no quarrel but that 
the fence erected by the respondents was a few inches 
or more north of the line as determined by the survey. 
The appellant back in 1937 transferred and con-
veyed an easement and right of way to one Frances H. 
Odell, a predecessor in interest to the respondent. (See 
Exhibit "A," Page 67.) The purpose of the easement 
was to furnish irrigation water to the tract of ground 
owned by the respondents herein. This right of way and 
ditch consisted of an open type irrigation ditch for part 
of the way, and then the water was routed through a 
pipe approximately 4 to 6 inches wide, and the water 
fiowed through this pipe for some 50 to 75 feet, and 
then came out on the property of the respondents to 
water certain peach trees and other products which 
existed on the south side of the respondents' home. This 
irrigation ditch-pipe arrangement had been in existence 
3 
for many years, and was originally put together upon 
agreement of the parties concerned. This irrigauu11 
ditch had been used up to the time that the appeLa:H; 
cemented the pipe and later destroyed the same. (;::lee 
Tr. 49 and 50.) 
There is no question but that the original main ' 
irrigation canal was filled in, but the new irrigation 
arrangements had pipe connections which would allm,, 
water to be placed in this particular ditch at a higlwr 
elevation than the farm of the respondent and so watu 
could be used on the south portion of the respondents' 
property. (See Tr. 112.) 
Testimony of the respondents reflected that the 
VV eber Basin hookup was inadequate to water the soutii 
orchard belonging to the respondents, and as a reswt 
there was considerable damage to peach trees and other 
farm products growing on the south side of the respon-
dents' home. They attempted to bring this water in their 
old right of way and which would have watered the f;outh 
portion of their property, by having water put in the 
ditch at a point south of the appellants' property and it 
could then follow along the regular irrigation channel 
and strike the top of the Cayias property, flow westward 
along the orchard of the respondents and so adequately 
water and care for that portion of the respondents' 
orchard. As a result of the destruction of the irrigation 
ditch, this plan of watering the south orchard of the 
respondents' property could not be accomplished. 
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POINT I 
'l'IIE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
e_.l_\ ltEFUSING TO AD.MIT IN EVIDENCE 
THE FULL ABSTRACT OF TITLE OF-
FERED AS EXHIBIT "A." 
Counsel had agreed at pre-trial and by stipulation 
during trial that the right of way across appellants' 
property was a deeded right of way owned by respon-
dents. (See Tr. 90.) On two occasions during trial the 
Court aJmitted the abstract of title for specific purposes. 
(See Tr. 64 and 90.) So the Court did admit the ab-
stract for certain purposes but not to a point where it 
would be objectionable or raise any point as to the 
agreed fact of respondents' right of way. Adequate 
testimony was had by the Court with respect to the 
property line between the properties and the testimony 
was had of a surveyor to reflect where he had found 
that line to exist. Counsel points out that without the 
abstract the findings of ownership do not stand. This 
matter of ownership of the respective parties had never 
been questioned. It was an accepted fact. 'Ve submit 
the Court had adequate evidence upon which to base 
its findings. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT NO. 4 IS CORRECT AND IS NOT 
INCONSISTENT 'VITH THE CONCLU-
SIONS OF LA \V AND DECREE. 
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Reference is made to appellant's statement with 
respect to the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and which reflect the time which the appellants lived j1; 
the area. The Court in its conclusions and decree mad(:; 
a determination that each party had a right to cross the 
property line between properties but purely for the right 1 
of cultivating and caring for the trees or other growtli 
of the parties, and when needed. This is not a constant 
easement to be used everyday but only when harrowing 
or other maintenance must be had with respect to the 
products grown on each of the respective parties' land. 
1 
Attention is respectfully called to the fact that thr 
appellant originally prepared the findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and decree and they were modified after 
appropriate motions of the respondents herein and that 
after some considerable argument both in court and 
otherwise, the proposed findings were submitted to the 
Court for signature after having been reviewed b}' 
counsel for both appellant and respondent. If the ap-
pellant had any real objections to the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and decree and any inconsistency 
might exist, there was adequate time to file an objection 
in the trial Court and, of course, any minor inconsistency 
that the respondent now claims could have been solved. 
We respectfuily submit that this objection is not timely, 
and appellants' objections came too late. In the case 
of Edyth Westerfield vs. Coops, a Utah case, decided 
by the Supreme Court on May 24, 1957, and found at 
6 Utah 2nd 262, 311 Pac. 2nd 78, the Court said: "The 
Utah Court took it upon itself to make findings appor· 
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t10nmg the California judgment among the plaintiff 
and 3 children equally, though the California Court had 
awarded an unapportional monthly sum. There was no 
reasonable objection directed toward said findings and 
we will not entertain such objections for the first time 
on appeal. (Underscoring ours.) See also Dolores 
Uranium Corp. vs. Jones, 14 Utah 2nd 280, 382 Pac. 
2nd 883, and Keller vs. Wixom, 123 Utah 2nd 103, 255 
Pac. 2nd 118. 
POINT III 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS STILL 
HAVE A SOURCE OF WATER WHICH 
THEY COULD CARRY ACROSS THE EASE-
MENT AND RIGHT OF WAY AND IN 
RULING THAT THE EASEMENT HAS 
NOT BEEN EXTINGUISHED. 
It is well recognized that an easement and right of 
way which someone buys and pays for, is not to be 
taken away in some unlawful fashion. See W eggeland 
vs. U jifusa, 14 Utah 2nd 364, 384 Pac. 2nd 590. In this 
case the appellant wilfully and intentionally destroyed 
the right of way and irrigation ditch which the respon-
dents had acquired by deed and conveyance. Certainly 
the maximum in equity cases, "Equity will not permit a 
wrong doer to profit by his wrong," is applicable in this 
case as the appellants committed a wrong wilfully and 
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knowingly. (See Jones Mining Co. vs. Carter, 1920, 
56 Utah 449, 191 Pac. 426.) 
In this case the appellants by their wrongful act 
deprived the respondents herein of their right of way, 
removed an easement and right of way which the respon-
dents had properly acquired by deed and grant. If the 
Court should now refuse to let respondents assert their 
right and claimed right of way then the appellants 
have clearly profited by their wrongful act. (See A. L. 
Williams & Sons vs. A. E. Brown, 18 Utah 2nd 22J 
418 Pac. 2nd 981. 
Appellant claims that an easement created by a 
grant may be lost when the purpose for which it was 
created ceased to exist. The Court did not so find, arnl 
the Court found that the purpose for which the ease-
ment was granted still existed an<l that the respondents 
could still utilize that easement and right of way anJ 
for the purpose for which is was acquired. For the pur-
pose of appeal the facts are viewed in a light most 
favorable to respondent. (See many cases cited Pacific 
Digest - Presumptions Sections 930, 931 and 934.) 
Counsel cites the matter of Brown vs. Oregon 
Shortline, 36 Utah 257, 103 Pac. 740 (1909), but this 
case is not applicable. There was no obstruction of a 
permanent nature, there was no voluntary acquisition 
or acceptance of any other right incompatible with the 
exercise or enjoyment of the right of way. The respou-
dents had used that easement and right of way for irri-
gating their farm ground for many years. There was 
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still water available for the use of that right of way. 
The only obstruction that came about was created be-
cause the appellants wilfully destroyed the right of way 
and pipeline that the respondents had utilized for many 
years in irrigating their south orchard. 
The court's attention is respectfully invited to the 
provisions of Volume 17 A American Jurisprudence at 
pages 764 and following, concerning Termination, Ex-
tinguishment and Revival of Easements. Section 159 
states at the beginning: "The Courts are not inclined 
to favor the forfeiture of easements," and cites in sup-
port thereof Barton vs. Jarvis, 218 Ky. 239, 291 SW 
38; Dean vs. Colt, 160 Oregon 342, 84 Pac. 2nd 481. 
Quoting again from 17 A of American J urispru-
dence, Sec. 165 (page 770): 
"The cases are agreed that at least where a 
right of way or other easement is created by 
grant, deed, or reservation, no duty is thereby 
cast upon the owner to make use thereof or enjoy 
the same as a condition to the right to retain his 
interest therein, and the mere nonuser of the 
easement will not extinguish it. (See the many 
cases cited under footnote 15). In fact, it is held 
that even nonuser for the length of the prescrip-
tive period does not of itself operate to extin-
guish an easement created by grant, deed, or 
reservation.'' 
We disagree with counsel for appellant as to the 
items set out on page IO of his brief, and without item-
izing, we respectfully point out that the deed itself 
is the best evidence as to the easement and in this pres-
ent case it makes no limitation as to the use therein of 
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Bonneville Irrigation water; and that what use the Re-
spondents made of the \Veber Basin hookup would not 
do away with an easement and right of way acquired 
by deed and into which the respondents would put water 
and so adequately and conveniently water their orchard. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that the Court 
sustain the decree of the trial Court, for the reaso11s 
indicated in this brief, and that such decree sustain the 
right of way owned by the respondents and sustain the 
property line between the parties as determined by the 
trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM J. CAYIAS 
Attorney for Respondent 
405 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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